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LxzAL BASIS OF

CAPITALISm.

By John R. Commons, Professor of

Economics in the University of Wisconsin.

Macmillan Company, New

York, 1924, pp. x, 394.
This book, in the words of its author, has as its aim "to work out an
evolutionary and behavioristic, or rather volitional, theory of value." As
the statement indicates, it is essentially theoretical and it is impossible to
give it an adequate review in a brief space. In fact, the virtue of the
book lies in the fact that it does not over-simplify the complex, a fault
all too common in those who write for common approval or who possess
limited powers of analysis.
The various headings: Mechanism, Scarcity, and Vorking Rules; Property, Liberty, and Value; Physical, Economic, and Moral Force; Transactions; Going Concern; The Rent Bargain, Feudalism and Use-Value; The
Price Bargain-Capitalism and Exchange-Value; The Wage Bargain-Industrialism; and Public Purpose suggest the fact that the book is less legalistic and more economic and philosophical than the title, "The Legal Basis of
Capitalism," suggests. Yet, true to title and purpose, Mr. Commons, who is
primarily a student of labor problems, builds his theory from a study of
numerous court decisions which serve as points of departure for substantial
excursions into the fields of economic theory, logic, philosophy, psychology

and ethics.
The discussion throughout reflects the language and motif of pragmatism and behaviorism. Unfortunately the exact sense in which he is using!
his terms is not always instantly comprehensible, and, although the reader is
extricated from time to time with explanations on subsequent pages, the
impression remains that the author has felt it his duty to put things down
and the reader's duty to figure out what they mean.
Such criticism should not detract, however, from the quality of scholarship which displays itself on every page. The book is a discriminating
piece of work. Mr. Commons demonstrates his thesis so adequately that
the reader assents as he hits at "ancient" conceptions of the individual will
as an entity, the social unit as one individual seeking his own pleasure, and
a host of other errors which the economist has less of an excuse for assuming than the courts, and of which he is guilty only to a lesser degree.
Indeed, courts must follow and not lead. The economist can .and
should agitate for change, seeking to discover a means for a more perfect
accommodation of the subtle, plastic aspects of human life, even though
the task involves running the gauntlet of error. In turn, as conceptions
are worked out and adopted by society, the courts will reflect the findings. How far sokial conceptions xill change and how far they will sweep
the courts along constitutes a good guessing match. A specific case: How
many decades preceding January 7, 1924 would it have been possible 'for
the Supreme Court to hold that the paragraph of the Transportation Act
providing for the payment by the 'railroads to the government of one-half
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of their earnings in excess of six per cent. on the value -of their property
was not a plain appropriation of property without compensation?
In his discussion of property Mr. Commons shows how the common
law conception of property as a physical thing, which was. the substancer of
the holdings in the Slaughter House case and the M'unn case, was "overturned" by the A4lgeyer case in i807 when property was viewed in the sense
of exchange-value. Now before his book has reached the reader we find a
conception of trusteeship recognized. What more need be said for the necessity of building theory, as Mr. Commons does, in terms of change?

Willard E. Atkins.
University of North Carolina.
TnE AmmucAN Just. By Andrew Alexander Bruce, Professor of taw
in Northwestern University, formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of North Dakota. ',facmillan Company, New York, IM, pp. 212.
In "The American Judge," Professor Bruce has presented to the general
public an interesting discussion of many questions now being widely debated in reference to the workings of cur judicial system.
The picture which the author portrays is a gloomy one. He points out
the need of a restatement of the law due to the masses of conflicting decisions even within the same jurisdiction. He depicts the unsatisfactory conditions attending the trial of criminal cases due to the incompetency of -the
average district attorney, the ease with which continuances are obtained
until witnesses have disappeared, and the baneful influence of politics in the
administration of criminal justice. He stresses the growing disrespect for
law in America, due to an increasing lack of religion and of reverence
among the people in general and to the breaking down of home life, especially in the larger cities. He complains of the excessive costs of litigation
and of the abuses of the contingent fee system. He deplores the destructive
and frequently wanton attacks made by sensational newspapers upon courts
and upon their decisions. He points out the prevalence of low standards for
admission to the bar, and the resulting large numbers of lawyers who abuse
the practice of the legal profession. He laments the fact that the current
tendency is to shorten rather than lengthen the tenure of judicial office,
making judges the prey of political influences and the victims of excited and
misguided public opinion. And finally he draws a vivid but discouraging
picture of the plight of the American judge, condemned to unjust attacks
without the opportunity to reply to them, forced into political campaigns
without the right to adopt or countenance the methods of the politician,
compelled to keep aloof from too much contact with men and affairs but
subject to the criticism, if he do so, of being an aristocrat, pilloried in the
press if he makes one false or even seemingly false move but passed by
unnoticed so far as the great general mass of his work is meritorious and
the result of constant and laborious foil.
Are these defects in our judicial system over-stressed? That there is
justification for the author's recital of them is unquestionable, for they cer-
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tainly exist. No doubt, however, they vary in their intensity in different
sections of the country, some prevailing here, some there, with the result
that the reality in any one place is not .as dismal as might be the impression
derived from the cumulative effect of the author's statements. Take, for
example, conditions in Philadelphia or in the State of Pennsylvania at large.
The costs of litigation are very small, even in cases of appeal. The evils
complained of in regard- to the trial of criminal cases are not marked.
The term of judges in the Common Pleas Court is ten years with re-elections the rule rather than the exception, while in the Supreme Court of the
State the term is twenty-one years. The judges are generally respected, and
receive kindly and even generous approval from the newspapers. On the
other hand we no doubt suffer in this jurisdiction from defects which in
other cities and states have been corrected. On the whole, reforms are
going on rapidly, and conditions are improving.
Professor Bruce discusses the now much-mooted question in regard to
the proposed limitation on the right of tbe majority of the court to declare
acts of the legislature unconstitutional. Ably demonstrating the justification
of the exercise of this power by the judiciary, the author nevertheless feels
that it is subject to abuse,. and that there is much to be said for the contention that the power should be exercised only in cases of comparative
certainty, and where that certainty exists in the minds of at least twothirds of the- sitting judges. It is pointed out that the close decisions, those
by a court divided five to four, have usually been in cases where economic
rather than purely legal questions were involved, and that in such litigation
there is a temptation, not always overcome, for the judges to use the power
here referred to in order to enforce abstract theories of their own. There
is no doubt that the power to declare statutes unconstitutional has vested
enormous authority in the American courts, that this power extends, in
practical effect, to the determination of many problems of a social oar economic rather than a technically legal nature, that in some cases such decisions have tended to check popular impulses and thereby to irritate-the-masses
of the people, and that, where such decisions have been decided by a. mere
majority vote of the judges, this irritation has naturally been augmented.
But without attempting to weigh all the arguments that have been advanced
on both sides of this question, it is not believed that the American people, on
sober second thought, really desire a limitation placed upon the judicial power
in this respect, or a change in the principle of majority rule in the judiciary.
Only an exceedingly unfortunate and unpopular ruling upon some important
statute of economic import will, if a mere majority ruling, be likely to
sweep the public into insistence upon a constitutional change requiring, d9
the author suggests, a two-thirds vote in such cases.
There are two propositions which Professor Bruce forcibly presents,
with which all will agree. One is that real reform in the practice and administration of the law can come only with and. by the reform of lawyers
themselves-in their better education and ethical 'standards, and in the realization on their part that they are officers of a court of justice, and not mere
gladiators and hirelings. The other principle insisted upon by the author is

